Non-existent Islamism. How the Kremlin propaganda is affecting Ukrainian Muslims by Yakubovych, М.
Non-existent Islamism  
"Islam is a very difficult line of work," said the KGB 
agent in a 1990s comedy. Strangely, these words from 
an already forgotten Russian film turned out to be al-
most prophetic for Islam throughout the post-Soviet 
space. It is no secret that Muslims are perceived to be 
somewhat different to followers of other religions: the 
attitude towards them is much more suspicious and 
this is a trend that has been around for many years. 
More liberal Muslims will argue that all this is the re-
sult of false stereotypes and biases: "Islam is not like 
that", "Islam means salam, which is peace". Those 
more radical will quote the Koranic "And never will the 
Jews or the Christians approve of you until you follow 
their religion" (Qur'an 2:120). Regardless of who is 
right, a woman in a hijab (or especially in a niqab) will 
be perceived differently to how she would be without 
this garment, while a bearded man with an "eastern 
accent" will be looked at differently to any typical Eu-
ropean. This is the reality of the modern Western 
world that has been formed over many years. I remem-
ber when I was in a small town in Bavaria in May, I was 
once asked if I was scared to walk the streets at night, 
because, as they say, it is full of immigrants. I jokingly 
replied in the negative, because the gangs in dark al-
leys speak exclusively in Arabic, which I know well.
LEANING IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS
In Ukraine, the topic of the Islamic threat has acquired 
somewhat new meanings. However, albeit surprisingly, 
they are not related so much to global trends (we, like 
all Europeans, are horrified by ISIS), as they are to our, 
post-Soviet ones. We have certain ultra-right forces 
that like to promote a phobia of migrants. Telling of 
that were the protests against the construction of a 
shelter for illegal immigrants in Yahotyn, Kyiv Oblast. 
However, this seems funny more than anything be-
cause it is probably not worth being afraid of migrants 
in a country that millions of citizens leave to work 
abroad (incidentally, the presence of Muslims on the 
streets of European cities does not stop them).
We can also look back on our history: 10 years ago, 
in the still Ukrainian Crimea, the problem of Islamists 
was also hyped up. Then, local communists, represent-
ed by Member of Parliament Leonid Hrach, talked about 
"Wahhabi bases", the press was horrified about how "the 
Tatars will slaughter the Slavs" and news about land 
taken over by Crimean Tatars were regularly sensa-
tionalised. In Ukraine, almost every city has land that 
someone has illegally seized, taken over or "snatched", 
but this was only mentioned from time to time. How-
ever, the Crimean Tatars were spoken about constant-
ly. In 2009, there was even a high-profile case on the 
peninsula that exposed an alleged organisation under 
the scary name Takfir wal-Hijra (Anathema and Exile). 
Paradoxically, members of the movement Hizb ut-Tah-
rir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), repressions 
against which in Russia are often talked about today in 
our media, came under pressure from Ukrainian intel-
ligence services. Few know this, but in Ukraine there 
are two Islamic books that one of our courts recognised 
as "extremist" a few years ago. Of course, comparing 
the level of attention our law-enforcement bodies pay 
to Muslim communities with that in Russia or other 
countries of the former USSR is pointless, because the 
level of religious freedom in Ukraine is relatively high, 
all the more so because in many cases the severity of 
the law is offset by its non-enforcement.
After 2014, when Viktor Yushchenko's almost-for-
gotten statement that "Crimean Tatars are the only 
true Ukrainians in Crimea" took on a new meaning 
with their critical position regarding Russia’s occupa-
tion of the peninsula, a certain "pro-Islamic sentiment" 
came to light. Recently, the Day of Remembrance for 
the Deportation of the Crimean Tatar People has begun 
to be widely commemorated, various media lament the 
crimes committed on the peninsula by the Russian Fed-
eration, much is written about the Crimean Tatars and 
in general considerable interest in this subject is shown. 
Above all, this is the position of the government. 
The analysis of the 2014 developments show clearly 
who and for what reason maintained a "level of ten-
sion" in Crimea and who wanted the demonisation of 
the Crimean Tatars. The Russian Federation played the 
anti-Tatar card to mobilise the pro-Russian part of the 
peninsula's population. Now, in the context of occupa-
tion, this move remains effective.
At the foreign policy level, Russia has been keeping 
quiet about the conf lict, so that nothing, good or bad, 
would be said about Crimea at all ("the status of Crimea 
is not up for discussion"). Meanwhile, messages for in-
ternal audiences are broadcast on a regular basis. From 
the very beginning of the aggression, Russia directed 
efforts towards discrediting the Mejlis of the Crimean 
Tatar people, their highest representative body, as well 
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as all groups that could not find a place in the new 
Crimean reality. Russian media accused migrants who 
left for the Ukrainian mainland for religious reasons 
of extremism, terrorism, aiding ISIS and so on. The 
Energy Blockade of 2015-2016 is another interesting 
topic: the Russian press wrote everything under the 
sun about Asker group of Lenur Islamov, Crimean Ta-
tar businessman (the group was actively involved in the 
organization of the blockade) trying to drill it into the 
minds of ordinary Russians that "on the other side" – 
the Ukrainian one, that is – "Islamic extremists" are 
fighting alongside American mercenaries in the Don-
bas.
PAWNS AND TRUMP CARDS
Recently a new trend has emerged. When, the "Don-
estk People’s Republic” authorities arrested well-
known Ukrainian religious scholar Ihor Kozlovskyi in 
2016 (he is still in detention), one of the explanations 
provided by "Secretary of the DPR Security Council" 
Oleksiy Khodakovskyi was Kozlovskyi's alledged at-
tempt to inspire a "radical Muslim uprising" in the 
"DPR". 
Over the past two years, several Islamic commu-
nities linked to the so-called Habashites (a Neo-Sufi 
group) and Madhalists (a kind of Salafism), have had 
their operations suspended in the occupied territories. 
Meanwhile, some controversial characters appeared, 
such as the "Mufti of the Donetsk People's Republic" Ri-
nat Aisin, or the "War Mufti of the Donbas" (self-titled), 
Tanai Kholkhanov. Over the past few months, a series 
of articles was published in the patriotic (read, nation-
al-chauvinistic) Russian press on the "criminal plan" 
of Turkey and the Kyiv authorities to unite Ukrainian 
Muslims against the Russian Federation. Some of these 
texts even "migrated" to the fairly liberal publications 
such as Novaya Gazeta. For example, a July piece enti-
tled "The Mejlis Intends to Unify Muslims" talks about 
how, with the support of Turkey, the Ukrainian "Muslim 
Brotherhood" is planning to build a mosque in order to 
"neutralise" the inf luence of the Spiritual Directorate 
of Muslims of Ukraine, which controls the Ar-Rahma 
mosque located in Kyiv. This mosque – as was covered 
more openly in other articles – is described as a future 
"breeding ground for extremism". The fact that a similar 
Muslim temple was constructed with the same support 
from Turkey and ceremoniously opened in August 2015 
in Moscow and in December 2016 in Minsk ("Orthodox 
atheist" Lukashenko even took part in Muslim prayer) 
does not bother Russian propagandists. The Ukrainian 
Muslims are not allowed to do this, especially those 
belonging to organizations with an active pro-Ukrain-
ian position or those who left Crimea because of their 
membership in political movements that do not agree 
with the presence of the Russian Federation on the 
peninsula.
The mufti of the Ummah Spiritual Directorate of 
Muslims of Ukraine, Said Ismahilov (forced to leave his 
native Donetsk and move to Kyiv in September 2014), 
also came under a barrage of Russian criticism, as did 
other activists in the Crimean Tatar movement, par-
ticipants in the EuroMaidan and ATO, as well as the 
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Muslims from Russia who bade farewell to their home-
land and found refuge in Ukraine. Unfortunately, some 
Ukrainian media that continue to be held in the grip of 
the Russian media scene often relay these phobias. In 
the perception of the Crimean Tatars, even today Is-
lamophobic trends are still far from extinct in the press 
of certain oblasts (for example, Kherson in Southern 
Ukraine). There is a good reason why a poll recently 
conducted by the Razumkov Centre, a nationwide soci-
ology group, shows that almost one in five residents of 
the south of Ukraine negatively perceives Muslims and 
Islam as a whole. 
As the modern Crimean Tatar movement remains 
liberal nationalism (mainly of a secular type), Russian 
propaganda about it is also based on a certain level of 
ethnophobia. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Foreign Min-
istry and other state bodies make statements about 
the persecution of Crimean Tatars by the occupying 
authorities in Crimea. Yet, they have to keep in mind 
that a potential conf lict is quite possible in Ukraine: its 
society can be vulnerable to scandals stirred up out of 
nothing, especially in the context of future presidential 
and parliamentary election campaigns.
THE NEED TO DECIDE
Somewhat strange situations are arising around the re-
ligious leadership of Crimean Tatars. The spiritual ad-
ministration of the Muslims of Crimea has long been 
re-registered under Russian law and in effect operates 
as a typical religious institution of the Russian Federa-
tion (also coming out with anti-Ukrainian statements). 
But just as with the Crimean communities of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate, no-
body in Ukraine has initiated a lawsuit to remove the 
separatists' registration. The motive is clear: Russia 
will immediately use this in its favour and statements 
will be issued (including on the international level) 
that Ukraine is refusing to support the Crimean Tatars 
and even persecutes those who welcome "reunification 
with Russia". But there is another path for Ukraine – 
to form an alternative. Such an alternative, namely, 
the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea, 
based in Kyiv, is about to be registered with the Minis-
try of Culture of Ukraine. This process has been de-
layed for various reasons. 
The same applies to the representation of the Presi-
dent of Ukraine in the Crimea, which is located in Kher-
son: according to the Crimean Tatar activists who have 
been protesting for a month next to its premises, this 
institution has not justified itself over three years of 
operation and demonstrated complete inaction, there-
fore it they demand an immediate change of its leader-
ship. In response, the representative of the President 
accused the activists of attempting to seize the premis-
es by force, so the conf lict is continuing. No matter who 
is right, this situation requires some sort of solution. 
Like many other deoccupation strategies connected 
with Crimea and Crimean Tatars.
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In the past few months (this information was al-
ready in the press, although it did not draw a wide-
spread response), at least two mosques in Ukraine, 
namely in Sumy and Zhytomyr, have been searched by 
law enforcement agencies. In the first case, they were 
looking for literature, the second was linked to crimi-
nal proceedings alleging that an "unidentified person 
is propagating hatred in the mosque". Weapons were 
not found, but some Islamic books were seized for ex-
amination (who did this and whether it was done at all 
is unclear). Among the seized literature (incidentally, 
files on the search were provided to the imam of the 
mosque) were completely neutral publications, includ-
ing a partial translation of the Qur'an into Ukrainian, 
accompanied by interpretations. Banning literature in 
the internet era may seem anachronistic to some of our 
readers, but this is possible in the post-Soviet space. 
For example, in Russia prohibited books can be planted 
in a "disloyal" mosque and be used to start a criminal 
case for extremism. This is exactly what is done – in 
particular, in the occupied Crimea. Will a similar thing 
happen here too? We hope not, although some Muslim 
groups in Ukraine have long been trying to brand their 
opponents as extremists. It is good that the authorities 
do not pay too much attention to this. 
On the one hand, it is a purely internal affair for Is-
lam, where some religious movements criticise others. 
However, unfortunately, this ultimately affects all Mus-
lims without exception, because an average citizen will 
not understand who is part of which community. Be-
cause if someone in a turban said that almost everyone 
here is an extremist, then maybe that is the truth, many 
will think. In relation to Islam, there is noticeable se-
lectivity: what is allowed to be said from the Orthodox 
church pulpit cannot be said in a mosque. 
When certain Orthodox communities spread lit-
erature that states in no uncertain terms that Ukraine 
does not exist, only a "united Russia" with its centre 
in Moscow, this does not stoke such resentment as it 
would in Muslim literature. An average citizen per-
ceives aggression in canonical-orthodox literature as 
an exception, whereas in Islamic writing, it is almost 
seen as a rule. Vigilance towards emigrants or people 
who may be truly affiliated with ISIS is necessary, but, 
as practice shows, they are often not looked for in the 
right place.
One other fact is that after the loss of opportuni-
ties to actively trade with Russia, many of Ukrainian 
enterprises have reoriented towards the Middle East 
and are almost queuing up in order to get "halal" sta-
tus (certifying that products are suitable for consump-
tion according to the requirements of Islam), which is 
basically equal to permission to export goods to Mus-
lim countries. As Larysa Polishchuk, vice-president of 
Ukrhalal, the Ukrainian Halal Industry Association, 
reports, a Ukrainian state standard in this area is be-
ing developed. Middle Eastern investors are also inter-
ested in Ukraine, and if Islamophobic sentiments sud-
denly become a trend, our businesses will not receive 
their investments. 
When Ukrainian officials say that the Russian Fed-
eration is prioritising "rocking the boat" over full-on 
aggression to undermine Ukraine, they are very close 
to the truth: in this way, we will never be able to form a 
more or less clear and consistent view on the "Eastern" 
topics that are extremely relevant to us.  
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